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Introduction
OVER twenty years ago, a lively exchange took place between UedaYoshifumi, the editor of the Shin Buddhism Translation Series, and two 
American scholars of Buddhism, Thomas Kasulis and Luis Gomez, concern­
ing whether or not s/zzfyzzi IB'L could legitimately be translated as “faith” in 
English. The Shin Buddhism Translation Series adopted the romanization of 
shinjin rather than translating the term as “faith.” It is argued the term faith 
is not only misleading, as an equivalent, but also ambiguous as a term in English 
itself. For Ueda, however, the ambiguity of this word is not the principal rea­
son for not using it. The main problem with the term is not only that it does 
not convey the essential meaning of shinjin, but also that such a translation 
would create a serious obstacle in transmitting the essence of Shinran’s thought.1 2
1 Ueda 1981, p. 507.
2 Kasulis 1981, p. 247; Gomez 1983a, p. 82. Some years later, Takeda Ryusei joined the 
debate, defending the view that faith is an appropriate term for the translation of shinjin. See
Kasulis and Gomez, however, question the need to retain the original 
Japanese word, shinjin, when there are a number of acceptable English equiv­
alents. While they acknowledge that one should not overemphasize the the­
istic appearance of Shinshu doctrine, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deny 
the fact that Shin Buddhism is one example of a religion of faith and that the 
shin If of shinjin filU means trust, belief or faith j Gomez writes:
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One has to share in the Committee’s concern with conveying 
Shinran’s meaning as accurately as possible, but one has to question 
the wisdom of the procedure followed. . . . The context of Shinran’s 
own teachings mark his doctrine as fitting the general type of “reli­
gion of faith.” . . . Why not let the context of Shinran’s own words 
gradually lead the reader to an understanding of Shinran’s concep­
tion of faith as the means to unity with the Buddha’s treasure house 
of merit and compassion?3
In his reply to Gomez’s criticism, however, Ueda stresses the view that: 
shinjin is not a “means to unity with the Buddha’s . . . merit and 
compassion” or an “act of trust in a power” beyond man; it is the 
merit and compassion and power itself. In other words, shinjin 
refers fundamentally to the true and real mind of Amida, not an atti­
tude of the mind of man.4
Without wanting to enter into the debate of whether or not it is appropriate to 
translate the word shinjin as faith, we are sympathetic to Ueda’s position in 
trying to keep the concept of shinjin distinct from faith. In our comparative 
study of Shinran and Kierkegaard’s thought, we also found it necessary to dif­
ferentiate between the two concepts. In our view, the concepts of shinjin and 
faith cannot be conceived as two manifestations or modifications of a single 
generic reality called faith; they point to two essentially different religious 
experiences. Faith cannot adequately express the experience of shinjin just as 
shinjin cannot express the experience of faith.
It seems to us that underlying the disagreement between Ueda and the two 
American scholars, there are two different approaches to religion at work. 
One approach is what can be called an experiential-expressive model of reli­
gion.5 This model affirms a basic unity of experience common to a wide diver­
sity of religions. In other words, different religions and belief systems are 
diverse expressions and objectifications of a common core experience.6
Takeda 1989,pp. 2-30. More recently, Hee-Sung Keel has found no “justification for not using 
‘faith’ as the translation lox shinjin.” See Keel 1995, pp. 82-83, n. 6.
3 Gomez 1983a, p. 83.
4 Ibid. 1983b, p. 416.
5 Here, I follow the distinction George A. Lindbeck makes between an experiential-expres­
sive model of religion and a cultural-linguistic one. See Lindbeck 1984, pp. 30-45.
6 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
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Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s understanding of faith can serve as a good exam­
ple of this approach. According to him, faith is an essential human quality of 
which belief systems are no more than expressions.
Faith ... is an essential human quality. One might argue that it is 
the essential human quality: that it is constitutive of man as human; 
that personality is constituted by our universal ability, or invitation, 
to live in terms of a transcendent dimension, and in response to it.7
7 Smith 1979, p. 129.
8 Lindbeck 1984, p. 35.
9 Katz 1978, p. 26.
The problem with this approach is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to describe, except in the broadest terms, an experience of faith common to a 
wide diversity of religions. The inevitable result is that the specific elements, 
which make any particular religion unique, are lost. Moreover, it begs the 
question about the relationship between experience and the language of belief 
systems. The latter is not simply an expression of a particular religious expe­
rience; it also shapes and forms it. To be religious is not primarily a matter of 
gaining the experience and then learning the language. Rather, one first be­
comes skilled in the language which itself shapes and produces our most pro­
found sentiments and attitudes.8 Therefore, it is extremely questionable to 
assume an underlying unity of the experience of faith common to widely 
diverse religions. Religious experience is always mediated through the par­
ticular language of a belief system.
There are No pure (i.e., unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical 
experience nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indi­
cation, or any grounds for believing, that they are umnediated. That 
is to say, all experience is processed through, organized by, and 
makes itself available to us in extremely complex epistemological 
ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-con­
tradictory, at best empty.9
The aforementioned problems with the experiential-expressive model can be 
avoided by an alternative cultural-linguistic model. In this approach, religions 
are not seen as expressions of primordial inner experiences that all humans 
potentially share. Instead, religions, like languages, are best understood as 
cultural frameworks that shape human experience. Human experience is 
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shaped, molded, and in a sense constituted by cultural and linguistic forms. 
Different religions do not diversely express similar experiences. Rather, they 
shape and produce different experiences.
A religion ... is similar to an idiom that makes possible the descrip­
tion of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of 
inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments. Like a culture or language, 
it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of indi­
viduals rather than being primary a manifestation of those subjec­
tivities.10
10 Lindbeck 1984, p. 33.
11 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
Although in the interplay between inner experience and the cultural-linguistic 
forms of religion, priority is given to the latter, the relationship between them 
is not unilateral but dialectical. The essential difference between a cultural- 
linguistic model of religion and an experiential-expressive one is that, while 
in the latter the external features of religion are derived from inner experi­
ences, in the former it is the inner experiences which are derivative.11
While neither Ueda nor Kasulis and Gomez explicitly formulate their views 
in terms of the two approaches of religions outlined above, Gomez’s position 
comes very close to an experiential-expressive model of religions in his as­
sumption of a “general type of religion of faith” of which shinjin is no more 
than a modification and expression. Ueda, in turn, by stressing the radical dif­
ference between shinjin and faith is more in line with a cultural-linguistic 
approach. For him, shinjin is not an instance of a “general type of religion of 
faith,” but rather it refers to a fundamentally different religious experience 
which the term faith cannot adequately express.
In our view, the cultural-linguistic model provides the most adequate basis 
for a comparative study of religion. Such an approach affords a more straight­
forward affirmation of the distinctive features of experience and the patterns 
of belief of different religions. At the same time, it avoids the danger of inter­
preting other religions in terms of our own.
It is from this perspective that this paper compares and contrasts the concept 
of shinjin in Shinran with that of faith in Kierkegaard. It will be shown that 
while these two concepts perform a similar function in their respective reli­
gious contexts and share some common characteristics in terms of structure, 
they refer to two fundamentally distinct religious experiences. In Shinran’s 
thought, shinjin is essentially an experience of awakening. Human beings 
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contribute nothing to this experience of awakening. It occurs in them totally 
by the power of Amida. In contrast, faith in Kierkegaard is not an experience 
of awakening, something you acquire once and for all. It is never a completed 
act. The believer is always in the process of reaffirming and preserving his 
faith. Although faith is essentially a gift of God’s grace, it requires a free 
human response. It is, in other words, a personal relationship between a trust­
ing human being and the gracious God.
Shinjin as Amida Buddha’s Gift
Teaching, practice and realization were the three fundamental dimensions of 
the religious life in primitive Buddhism. In other words, the realization of 
Buddhahood was thought to be attained through the practice of the Buddha’s 
teaching. In line with this basic understanding of Buddhist religious life, 
Shinran called his major work: The True Teaching, Practice, and Realization 
of the Pure Land Way. But in fact, though not mentioned in the title, the central 
part of this work is Chapter Three: “The True Shinjin of the Pure Land Way.” 
We can say that the whole work is developed from the perspective of this 
chapter. For Shinran, the realization of Buddhahood is attained not through 
practice but through shinjin. While in primitive Buddhism, shinjin was con­
sidered to be the first stage on the path to enlightenment, in Shinran it becomes 
the true and ultimate cause of enlightenment. In fact, shinjin overlaps with 
the meaning of enlightenment itself. Shinjin, however, arises in human beings, 
not through an act of will on their part, but through Amida Buddha transfer­
ring his true and real mind to sentient beings ridden with falsity and selfish 
desires.
According to Shinran, shinjin arises in sentient beings as a threefold mind: 
sincere mind (shishin SL'), entrusting with joy (shingyd sK), and aspiration 
for birth (yokushd Reading the Eighteenth Vow according to his insight
that shinjin is not an act of will, but solely the action of Amida in human 
beings, Shinran writes:
All sentient beings, as they hear the Name, realize even one thought­
moment of shinjin and joy, which is directed to them from Amida’s 
sincere mind, and aspiring to be bom in that land, they then attain 
birth and dwell in the stage of nonretrogression. Excluded are those 
who commit the five grave offenses and those who slander the right 
dharma.12
12 CWS vol. l,p. 80.
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Contrary to the original meaning of this text, Shinran considers the sincere 
mind, the entrusting and the aspiration as attributes of Amida and not as qual­
ities of the human mind.13 In traditional Buddhism, these were qualities of the 
individual who undertook the right practices and disciplines for the attainment 
of Buddhahood. An essential feature of the original Pure Land path was that 
one does not seek merely one’s own realization of enlightenment but through 
the transference of merit accumulated in one’s practice (eko 0[p]), one con­
tributes in turn to the enlightenment of all beings. Thus, the directing of merit 
becomes an intrinsic part of the aspiration for birth in the Pure Land and for 
enlightenment. In Shinran’s thought, however, the concepts of practice and 
merit are completely reformulated. Since, according to him, human beings 
are deeply evil and, therefore, incapable of genuine practice, they have no 
merit to transfer. Amida alone is the source of practice and merit which are 
transferred to human beings. Explaining the threefold mind of shinjin, Shinran 
writes:
13 It was Shinran’s logic of shinjin that compelled him to read into the text the idea that the 
mind of shinjin is directed by Amida. The original text of the Eighteenth Vow says: “If, when 
I attain Buddhahood, the sentient beings of the ten quarters, with sincere mind entrusting them­
selves, aspiring to be bom in my land, and saying my Name perhaps even ten times, should 
not be bom there, may I not attain the supreme enlightenment. Excluded are those who commit 
the five grave offenses and those who slander the right dharma.” Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 493.
With sincere mind entrusting themselves: Sincere means true and 
real. “True and real” refers to the Vow of the Tathagata being true 
and real; this is what sincere mind means. From the very beginning 
sentient beings, who are filled with blind passions, lack a mind true 
and real, a heart of purity, for they are possessed of defilements, 
evil, and wrong views. Entrusting is to be free of doubt, believing 
deeply and without any double-mindedness that the Tathagata’s 
Primal Vow is true and real. This entrusting with sincere mind, then, 
is that arising from the Vow in which Amida urges every being 
throughout the ten quarters, “Entrust yourself to my Vow, which is 
true and real”; it does not arise from the hearts and minds of foolish 
beings of self-power.14
Shinran’s explanation of the threefold mind of shinjin, may give the impres­
sion that there are three separate elements in s/zznjm. This is not the case. The
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three elements point to the single and perfect mind of shinjin, which is free 
from the hindrance of doubt. Shinran writes:
Truly we know that although the terms “sincere mind,” “entrust­
ing,” and “aspiration for birth” differ, their significance is the same. 
Why? Because these three minds are already completely untainted 
by the hindrance of doubt. They are therefore the true and real mind 
that is single. This is called the diamondlike true mind. The dia­
mondlike true mind is true and real shinjin.15
15 Ibid., p. 107.
16 Ibid., p. 461.
True and real shinjin is completely free from the hindrance of doubt because 
this “shinjin is none other than Buddha-nature. This Buddha-nature is dhar­
ma-nature. Dharma-nature is dharma-body.”16
It becomes clear from the above that, for Shinran, shinjin is not the result 
of a person’s own resolution, but an absolute gift from Amida Buddha; not 
an operation of the human will but the very activity of Amida Buddha in the 
mind of the individual.
The view that shinjin is a gift from Amida Buddha naturally raises the ques­
tion: how does shinjin arise in human beings? In order to answer this question, 
we must consider the Pure Land Buddhist practice of Nembutsu. According 
to Pure Land Buddhism, Amida Buddha, in fulfilling his bodhisattva vows 
over enormous stretches of time and against immeasurable obstacles and 
hardships, has accumulated a vast store of merit that can be transferred to all 
other spiritual beings so as to enable them to attain enlightenment. Thus, the 
Nembutsu becomes the primary vehicle of merit-transference, which offers 
the enabling conditions for birth in the Pure Land and the attainment of 
enlightenment. The practice of Nembutsu consists of saying and considering 
over and over again the formula, Namu-Amida-Butsu Prior to
Shinran, the Nembutsu was a kind of spiritual practice performed by the indi­
vidual as an effort to attain birth in the Pure Land and enlightenment. For 
Shinran, however, the practice of Nembutsu is given by Amida. Hence, he 
calls it “great practice.”
Reverently contemplating Amida’s directing of virtue for our going 
forth to the Pure Land, I find that there is great practice, there is 
great shinjin. The great pratice is to say the Name of the Tathagata 
of unhindered light. This practice, embodying all good acts and 
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possessing all roots of virtue, is perfect and most rapid in bringing 
them to fullness. It is the treasure ocean of virtues that is suchness 
or true reality. For this reason, it is called great practice. This prac­
tice arises from the Vow of great compassion, which is known as 
“the Vow that all the Buddhas extol the Name,” “the Vow that all 
the Buddhas say the Name,” and “the Vow that all the Buddhas 
praise the Name.” It might also be called “the Vow of directing 
virtue for our going forth” and “the Vow in which the saying of the 
Name is selected.”17
17 Ibid., p. 13.
18 Called by Shinran “the Vow that all the Buddhas extol the Name,” it says: “If, when I 
attain Buddahood, the countless Buddhas throughout the worlds in the ten quarters do not all 
praise and say my Name, may I not attain the supreme enlightenment.” Ibid.
19 Ueda and Hirota 1989, pp. 149-150.
The view, suggested here, that the Buddhas throughout the universe say and 
praise Amida’s Name, is based on the Seventeenth Vow.18 The source of great 
practice in human beings lies precisely in the Buddhas’ praise of Amida’s 
Name. By hearing the Name, beings are awakened to the nature of Amida and 
his Vow of compassion. Shinjin arises in the encounter with the Name of 
Amida. Explaining the relationship between the practice of reciting the Name 
and shinjin, Ueda writes:
Because the Name is given—is spread throughout the universe by 
all the Buddhas—sentient beings are able to hear it and come to 
know Amida’s Primal Vow. Through hearing the Name—not just 
grasping it intellectually, but being penetrated by the dynamic real­
ity of compassion that it embodies—shinjin is awakened in them. 
This shinjin is therefore also “given,” and is itself the Buddha’s 
wisdom-compassion turning itself over to beings. Further, this shin­
jin expresses itself in utterance of the Name, which is true practice, 
and which therefore results in attainment of birth.19
The Name, however, cannot be viewed as some objective and self-subsisting 
reality existing outside the mind of the practicing individual. It has reality 
only as the subjectivity of shinjin expressed in the practice of recitation. As 
Alfred Bloom, rightly points out,
For Shinran, the name of Amida Buddha is not some metaphysical 
entity of some objective existence somewhere in the world, nor 
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truly are the Buddhas who speak this name some type of objective 
existences located in the universe. The name, spoken by the Bud­
dhas, or heard by people in whom the faith is to be aroused, is the 
name heard upon the lips of ordinary people, or the content of teach­
ing in which Amida Buddha’s intention is praised.20
20 Bloom 1965, p. 55.
21 CWS vol. 1, p. 538.
22 Ueda and Hirota 1989, p. 144.
Thus, as “great practice,” the Nembutsu is not something human beings per­
form to attain birth. Although the practicing individuals recite the Nembutsu, 
in reality it is the activity of Amida Buddha awakening shinjin in them. Both 
the practice of recitation and shinjin as the ensuing inner state of mind are 
given by Amida Buddha. Therefore, shinjin and Nembutsu are inseparable 
realities. Shinran writes:
[Although shinjin and nembutsu are two, since shinjin is to hear 
and not doubt that you are saved by only a single pronouncing, 
which is the fulfillment of practice, there is no shinjin separate from 
nembutsu; . . . Both should be understood to be Amida’s Vow. 
Nembutsu and shinjin on our part are themselves the manifestation 
of the Vow.21
Both Nembutsu and shinjin emerge as manifestations of Amida’s activity in 
the human person. It follows that there is nothing that one can do to acquire 
shinjin. For “both the entrusting of oneself to the Vow and the saying of the 
Name are given unfolded in beings through and as the activity of the Bud­
dha.”22 The reason there is no practice whatsoever human beings can perform 
to attain shinjin is due to their evil and passion-ridden nature. Whatever good 
deed a human being appears to be doing, it is always done with self-seeking 
calculation in mind, making it, therefore, impossible to attain the incompara­
ble goodness and purity of Amida Buddha’s nature. For Shinran, there is an 
infinite gulf between passion-ridden human nature and Amida Buddha’s 
nature, such that no good deed on our part can bridge. Only an unconditional 
and absolute act of compassion by Amida Buddha can bridge that infinite gap. 
It should be noted, however, that the awareness of the selfish desires that 
permeate human life are not the result of self-reflection, but of the action of 
Amida Buddha in human beings.
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I know nothing at all of good or evil. For if I could know thoroughly, 
as Amida Tathagata knows, that an act was good, then I would know 
good. If I could know thoroughly, as the Tathagata knows, that an 
act was evil, then I would know evil. But with a foolish being full 
of blind passions, in this fleeting world—this burning house—all 
matters without exception are empty and false, totally without truth 
and sincerity. The nembutsu alone is true and real.23
23 CWS vol. 1, p. 679.
24 Ueda and Hirota, 1989, pp. 169-170.
25 CWS vol. l,p. 80.
26 Ibid., p. 475.
Since shinjin is considered to be entirely the activity of Amida Buddha with­
out involving any kind of decision or act of resolution on the part of human 
beings, Shinran insists that when it occurs one attains the stage of non-retro- 
gression. In other words, the achievement of the ultimate goal of birth in the 
Pure Land and the attainment of enlightenment are assured in the moment of 
realizing shinjin. In the tradition of Pure Land Buddhism prior to Shinran, the 
stage of non-retrogression referred to a stage attained by those bom in the 
Pure Land after death. It was taught that, after birth in the Pure Land, one 
attains the stage of non-retrogression and thereafter continues to perform 
practices until one attains enlightenment.24 Departing from this traditional 
understanding, Shinran stresses that this stage is attained at the moment of the 
arising of shinjin. He stresses, furthermore, that the realization of shinjin coin­
cides with the moment of being truly settled and the attainment of birth. The 
passage upon which Shinran bases this particular understanding of birth in 
the immediate present is the one on the fulfillment of the Eighteenth Vow in 
the Larger Sutra, quoted above. There, it is stated that, in a single thought­
moment (ichinen —^) of shinjin, human beings “attain birth and dwell in the 
stage of nonretrogression.”25 Explaining the identity of the arising of shinjin 
with immediate attainment of birth, he writes:
When one realizes true and real shinjin, one is immediately grasped 
and held within the heart of the Buddha of unhindered light, never 
to be abandoned. . . . When we are grasped by Amida, immedi­
ately—without a moment or a day elapsing—we ascend to and 
become established in the stage of the truly settled; this is the mean­
ing of attain birth ,26
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Further, in another work, he states:
They then attain birth means that when a person realizes shinjin, 
he or she is bom immediately. “To be bom immediately” is to dwell 
in the stage of nonretrogression. To dwell in the stage of nonretro­
gression is to become established in the stage of the truly settled. 
This is also called the attainment of the equal of perfect enlighten­
ment. Such is the meaning of they then attain birth.
Then means immediately; “immediately” means without any 
passage of time and without any passage of days.27
27 Ibid., p. 455.
28 Ibid., pp. 674-675.
The fundamental reason for Shinran’s emphasis on the attainment of birth in 
the Pure Land as a present reality is deeply grounded in his understanding of 
shinjin as an act of entrusting that, both in arising and settling, is entirely the 
work of Amida. By making the realization of shinjin coincide with birth in 
the Pure Land, Shinran brought about a revolutionary change in traditional 
Pure Land Buddhism. What is crucial now is not the moment of death but the 
moment of the arising of shinjin. Once shinjin is realized, even though a per­
son remains in this world, he lives and dwells in the transcendental realm of 
enlightenment.
While Shinran stresses birth in the Pure Land as a present reality, he does 
not identify it with the attainment of enlightenment itself. Being deeply aware 
of the defiled character of the physical body fraught with blind passions, only 
after death, when the karmic bonds to this world are broken, is one, for the 
first time, able to fully realize Buddhahood. In the Tannishd, the possibility 
of attaining enlightenment with this present body is clearly rejected:
On the assertion that one attains enlightenment even while main­
taining this bodily existence full of blind passions.
This statement is completely absurd. . . . [I]t is extremely diffi­
cult to free oneself from blind passions and the hindrances of karmic 
evil in this life. . . . According to the true essence of the Pure Land 
way, one entrusts oneself to the Primal Vow in this life and realizes 
enlightenment in the Pure Land.28
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Faith as a Divine Gift and Human Decision
Kierkegaard frequently stresses that faith is a gift of divine grace, a miracle 
and cannot, therefore, be produced by an act of will.29 But although as grace, 
faith is clearly a gift, he maintains that it is also something we do, in other 
words, it involves a free and personal decision. “Belief is not knowledge but 
an act of freedom, an expression of will.”30 In a crucial passage of his Journals 
and Papers, the dialectical tension between grace and human freedom is set 
forth like this:
29 Kierkegaard 1985, pp. 62, 65.
30 Ibid., p. 83.
31 Ibid. 1975b, p. 352.
In order to constrain subjectivity, we are quite properly taught that 
no one is saved by works, but by grace—and corresponding to that 
—by faith. Fine. But am I therefore unable to do something myself 
with regard to becoming a believer? Either we must answer this 
with an unconditioned ‘no,’ and then we have fatalistic election by 
grace, or we must make a little concession. The point is this—sub­
jectivity is always under suspicion, and when it is established that 
we are saved by faith, there is immediately the suspicion that too 
much has been conceded here. So an addition is made: But no one 
can give himself faith; it is a gift of God I must pray for. Fine, but 
then I myself can pray, or must we go farther and say: No, praying 
(consequently praying for faith) is a gift of God which no man can 
give to himself; it must be given to him. And what then? Then to 
pray aright must again be given to me so that I may rightly pray for 
faith, etc. There are many, many envelopes—but there must still be 
one point or another where there is a halt at subjectivity. Making 
the scale so large, so difficult, can be commendable as a majestic 
expression for God’s infinity, but subjectivity cannot be excluded, 
unless we want to have fatalism.31
Faith is not an act of will, but a miracle of grace. However, it does not exclude 
the final decision of the will. Human freedom is still operative in the midst of 
grace. In fact, the dialectic between God’s grace and human freedom must, 
at one point or another, be stopped by human subjectivity. In other words, 
humans have a role to play in the act of faith. We cannot independently, by 
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an act of will, reach for the gift of faith. We can either accept or refuse it. Even 
God will not override our freedom.
At the heart of Kierkegaard’s account of faith is the idea of subjectivity and 
the conception of truth associated with it. Faith, he insists, “is rooted in sub­
jectivity” and constitutes its “highest passion.”32 “The essential thing about 
subjectivity is that in resolution and the decision of choice one runs a risk. 
This is the absolute decision.”33 Therefore, when he refers to faith as a passion, 
he is not thinking of faith as a mere emotional state. Faith as passion means 
personal choice and involvement as opposed to detached objective knowl­
edge.
32 Ibid. 1990, p. 132.
33 Ibid. 1975b, p. 346.
34 Ibid. 1990, p. 199. It should be noted that Kierkegaard’s definition of truth as subjectivity 
applies only to the essential truth, that is, to the truth that has an essential relationship to exis­
tence. “The reader will note that what is being discussed here is essential truth, or the truth that 
is related essentially to existence, and that it is specifically in order to clarify it as inwardness 
or as subjectivity that the contrasted is pointed out.” Ibid.
In trying to delimit the realm of faith, Kierkegaard distinguishes two pos­
sible approaches to religious truth: objective and subjective reflection.
When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected 
upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates himself. 
What is reflected upon is not the relation but that what he relates 
himself to is the truth, the true. If only that to which he relates him­
self is the truth, the true, then the subject is in the truth. When the 
question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual relation is 
reflected upon subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in 
truth, the individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate 
himself to untruth.34
Kierkegaard’s main point here seems to be that it is possible for an individual 
to believe what is objectively true while being personally in untruth and vice 
versa. And if the two collide, it is subjective truth that ultimately matters. The 
crucial question for Kierkegaard is not whether a person’s beliefs are objec­
tively right but whether the person has the right kind of relationship to what 
is believed. He illustrates his claim by the famous comparison between some­
one who, though living in the midst of Christianity and having a true con­
ception of God, prays to Him in a false spirit, and someone who, though he 
lives in an idolatrous land, prays to his idol with the passion of infinity. 
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According to Kierkegaard, it is at the side of the second man, not the first, 
that more truth is to be found. “The one prays in truth to God although he is 
worshiping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore 
in truth worshiping an idol.”35
35 Ibid., p. 201.
36 Ibid., p. 204. “When belief resolves to believe, it runs the risk that it was an error, but nev­
ertheless it wills to believe. One never believes in any other way; if one wants to avoid risk, 
then one wants to know with certainty that one can swim before going into the water.” Ibid. 
1985, p. 83, n. 53.
37 Edwards 1973, pp. 513-514.
38 Gardiner 1988, p. 98.
39 Blanshard 1968, pp. 15-16.
As to the subjective character of religious truth and faith, Kierkegaard 
stresses that the degree of involvement of the subject increases to the extent 
that objective certainty diminishes. Subjective interest in the act of faith 
reaches its peak when every objective certainty disappears. Where there is 
objective certainty or security, he says, there can be no question of risk and 
where there is no possibility of risk, there can be no faith either. “Faith is the 
contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective 
uncertainty. If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; 
but because I cannot do this, I must have faith.”36
Such a position appears to suggest a religious relativism in which “to say 
that a belief is true means no more than that it is held sincerely and without 
reservations.”37 In other words, it allows any believer to be counted as “in the 
truth” provided only that he is passionately committed to his belief, irrespec­
tive of its content. In this sense, even an atheist can be considered “in the 
truth,” as long as his atheism is sufficiently profound and unqualified.38 Some 
have gone so far as to suggest that to reduce faith to a passionate commitment 
of the will destroys the very basis of Christian faith.
For it implies that there are no common truths for Christians to 
accept, no common principles by which their lives may be guided, 
indeed no common Deity for them to contemplate and worship. The 
Kierkegaardian subjectivity would dissolve these things away into 
a set of processes in individual minds where there would be as many 
Christianities as there were persons to exercise their “inwardness” 
and their passion.39
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Kierkegaard does make the claim that “truth is subjectivity.” This, however, 
does not imply that truth is a construct of the self. Subjectivity is not to be 
equated with subjectivism. When he defines faith as the “infinite passion of 
inwardness,” he is not suggesting that a belief is true just because one believes 
it to be true. It should be noted that Kierkegaard mentions “objective uncer­
tainty” in the act of faith. In other words, the subjectivity of the act of faith 
arises precisely in the relation of the existing individual to an objectively given 
truth.40 If there were no question of a relation to an objective reality, then there 
would be no cause for passion nor subjectivity. It is precisely because faith is 
a response to a reality that is objectively uncertain, that the existing individual 
must choose with passion. Therefore, Christian faith does not lose its objective 
content by the thesis that “truth is subjectivity.” Even though he stresses the 
subjective element in the act of faith, he never loses sight of its objective con­
tent nor confuses subjectivity with objectivity.
40 Thomas 1994, p. 77.
41 Kierkegaard 1998, pp. 117-118.
The essential Christian exists before any Christian exists; it must 
exist in order for one to become a Christian. It contains the quali­
fication by which a test is made of whether someone has become a 
Christian; it maintains its objective continuance outside all believ­
ers, while it also is in the inwardness of the believer. In short, here 
there is no identity between the subjective and the objective. If the 
essentially Christian enters into the hearts of ever so many believ­
ers, every believer realizes that it did not arise in his heart. ... It is 
therefore a volatilization of the concept, a dislocation of all the 
essentially Christian, when one admits the wordplay that a revela­
tion is a qualification belonging to subjectivity, or is the direct iden­
tity of subject-object. . . . No, even if no one had become aware that 
God had revealed himself in human form in Christ, he still had 
revealed himself.41
Here Kierkegaard makes it clear that the object of faith must exist indepen­
dent of the self and prior to the act of faith. It is true that for him faith is the 
highest passion of subjectivity. But this does not imply a denial of an objective 
reality in the act of faith. His concern is to show that the only possible means 
by which one comes to relate “in truth” to the object of faith is by develop­
ing one’s “inwardness” and “subjectivity.” In other words, while recognizing 
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that the objective content of doctrines is important, he stresses that the truth 
about such doctrines can only be gained through subjective appropriation. 
Kierkegaard tries to prevent both a conception of faith as an objective truth, 
which can be acquired without personal engagement and the volatilization of 
faith into an amorphous subjectivism. By the principle that “truth is subjec­
tivity,” Kierkegaard wishes to tie together the “what” with the “how” of faith 
into one indissoluble whole.
The remarkable thing is that there is a How with the characteristic 
that when the How is scrupulously rendered the What is also given, 
that this is the How of ‘faith.’ Right here, at its very maximum, 
inwardness is shown to be objectivity.42
42 Ibid. 1975b, p. 351.
43 Ibid. 1990, p. 204.
This passage seems to suggest that the degree of passion and commitment to 
religious beliefs is by itself sufficient to ensure the validity of its objective 
content. But how can the subjective aspect of faith alone certify the reality of 
what is believed? The answer must be sought in the nature of the object of 
faith. The object of faith is not given immediately, such that it determines 
assent, rather it lies beyond the reach of any rational demonstration and any 
sort of objective warrant. It is, in other words, a paradox. “When the subjec­
tivity, inwardness, is truth, then truth, objectively defined, is a paradox; and 
that truth is objectively a paradox shows precisely that subjectivity is truth.”43 
It is precisely the paradoxical character of its object which makes the act of 
faith purely subjective. The greater the improbability that some reality is 
objectively true, the greater the passionate commitment necessary to accept 
it. The passionate commitment in the act of faith reaches its peak when every 
shred of objective certainty disappears. This, however, does not mean that 
passionate commitment involved in the act of faith guarantees the objective 
truth of the paradox. The paradox is the proper object of faith precisely be­
cause there is no evidence for it.
Kierkegaard makes the distinction between simple and absolute paradox. 
The simple paradox refers to the Socratic view of truth. According to the 
Socratic model, knowing the ultimate truth was a matter of the existing indi­
vidual becoming aware of what was present, though dormant, in his own mind, 
and the teacher’s function consisted in reminding him of what he implicitly 
possessed; it was a matter of recollecting knowledge that was in some sense 
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already there. As this truth, however, cannot be fully apprehended by the 
existing subject, it manifests itself as the unknown. Kierkegaard calls this 
unknown the god “against which the understanding in its paradoxical passion 
collides.”44 The unknown is the frontier of the understanding that is contin­
ually arrived at, but which cannot be assimilated by the categories of the 
understanding. The paradox is not something the existing individual encoun­
ters outside of himself; thought itself is paradoxical. By its nature, the under­
standing seeks absolute knowledge, but, as with everything human, it is finite 
and has limits. At the extreme point of its limits, it encounters the unknown 
that cannot be thought. “This, then, is the ultimate paradox of thought: to want 
to discover something that thought itself cannot think.”45 The paradox lies in 
the fact that reason can never reach what it seeks.
44 Ibid. 1985, p. 39.
45 Ibid., p. 37.
46 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
47 Ibid., p. 45.
The absolute paradox refers to the Christian conception of the incarnation 
and represents a radically new point of departure for approaching the highest 
truth. Christianity assumes that the existing individual is not in possession of 
ultimate truth. Since human beings lack the truth about God, they must receive 
that truth through a revelation which comes directly from God. In order to 
make it possible for the individual to receive the truth, God appears in human 
form. There is a moment at which the eternal enters the temporal sphere, tak­
ing upon itself the limitations of human existence. However, that a particular 
human being is also God is something that transcends the possibilities of 
human knowledge. As Kierkegaard puts it: “This human being is also the god. 
How do I know that? Well, I cannot know it, for in that case I would have to 
know the god and the difference, and I do not know the difference as the under­
standing has made it like unto that from which it differs.”46
This surely is a paradoxical state of affairs. It represents what Kierkegaard 
calls the absolute paradox. For in order to know something about God, the 
human person has to know first that it is absolutely different from him. This 
knowledge, however, cannot be acquired by human beings “because the 
understanding cannot even think the absolute different.”47 It has to be taught 
by God, Himself. Why is the human person unable to acquire this knowledge? 
The answer is that, in sin, human beings have withdrawn from God so utterly 
that they cannot perceive the separation between God and themselves. If, in 
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the Socratic perspective, eternal truth was already paradoxical, it becomes an 
absolute paradox in Christianity where God and the existing subj ect are totally 
disproportionate due to sin. The absurdity of the Christian paradox lies in the 
fact that despite the absolute difference between God and the human person, 
God enters into relation with him to reveal his sinful state and subsequent 
redemption.
Thus the paradox becomes even more terrible, or the same paradox 
has the duplexity by which it manifests itself as the absolute—neg­
atively, by bringing into prominence the absolute difference of sin 
and, positively, by wanting to annul this absolute difference in the 
absolute equality.48
48 Ibid., p. 47.
49 Ibid., p. 49.
50 Ibid., p. 59.
51 Ibid.
52 See Hannay 1982, p. 107; Blanshard 1969, p. 15.
53 Kierkegaard 1985, p. 87.
54 Ibid. 1990, p. 211.
When confronted by the absolute paradox, reason is left with a choice: either 
to come to a mutual understanding with the paradox in the passion of faith or 
to reject it and take offence.49 But how does reason come to an understand­
ing with the paradox? Reason is not “supposed to understand the paradox but 
is only to understand that this is the paradox.”50 The mutual understanding 
between reason and the paradox occurs “when the understanding steps aside 
and the paradox gives itself, and the third something, the something in which 
it occurs ... is that happy passion to which we shall now give a name. ... We 
shall call it faith.”51 The paradoxical character of God’s revelation in Jesus 
lies in the fact that it is revealed in history, and yet its content is such that it 
transcends the categories of the understanding. Only by faith, can we gain 
access to it.
Some writers have interpreted the paradox as a logical contradiction. For 
them, when Kierkegaard asks for faith in the paradox, he is asking the believer 
to put logic aside and embrace what is unintelligible to human reason.52 It is 
true that Kierkegaard often refers to the paradox as a contradiction; the incar­
nation is even described as a “self-contradiction.”53 The contradiction con­
sists in the fact that the eternal “can become historical only in direct opposition 
to all human understanding.”54 This contradiction is further designated as the 
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absurd. “The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence in time, 
that God has come into existence, has been bom, has grown up.”55 This is not 
an object for knowledge; it is only an object for faith. “For all knowledge is 
either knowledge of the eternal, which excludes the temporal and the histor­
ical as inconsequential, or it is purely historical knowledge, and no knowl­
edge can have as its object this absurdity that the eternal is the historical.”56 
The incarnation as the object of faith, however, is not absurd or paradoxical 
in the sense that it violates the principles of logic, but in the sense that it 
absolutely transcends human knowledge.57
55 Ibid., p. 210.
56 Ibid. 1985, p. 62.
57 For the view that the paradox is to be understood as above reason not against reason, see 
Evans 1989, pp. 360-363; ibid. 1998, pp. 78-92; Fabro 1962, pp. 174-178; Soe 1962,pp.2O6- 
227; Emmanuel 1996, p. 45.
58 Kierkegaard 1975a, p. 399.
59 Ibid. 1990, p. 568.
Although Kierkegaard often speaks of the paradox or absurd as the object 
of faith that requires one to believe against understanding, he, at times, follows 
the more traditional view of faith as above reason.
What I usually express by saying that Christianity consists of para­
dox, philosophy in mediation, Leibniz expresses by distinguishing 
between what is above reason and what is against reason. Faith is 
above reason. By reason he understands, as he says many places, a 
linking together of truths, (enchainment), a conclusion from causes. 
Faith therefore cannot be proved, demonstrated, comprehended, for 
the link which makes a linking together possible is missing, and 
what else does this say than that it is a paradox.58
The absurd or the paradox is above reason and therefore not really sup­
ported by reason. However, there is some way in which reason can affirm 
what is above it and distinguish between the absurd of Christianity and what 
may be called vulgar absurdities or nonsense. Therefore, the person who em­
braces the absolute paradox does not believe mere nonsense. The believer 
“both has and uses his understanding ... in order to see to it that he believes 
against the understanding. Therefore he cannot believe nonsense against the 
understanding, which one might fear, because the understanding will pene- 
tratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder him in believing it.”59 To 
198
SOUSA: SHINJIN AND FAITH
reason is assigned the negative but important task of pointing out the incom­
prehensibility of the paradox.
Kierkegaard’s position bears some similarity to Pascal’s view that God is 
incomprehensible to the human intellect. According to Pascal, reason can nei­
ther prove nor disprove the existence of God.
If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having 
neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are incapable 
of knowing either what He is or if He is. This being so, who will 
dare to undertake the decision of the question? Not we, who have 
no affinity to Him.60
60 Pascal 1963, p. 550.
61 Ibid.
62 Kierkegaard 1967, p. 7.
The decision to believe must be made without the benefit of any objective 
assurances. In his celebrated “wager argument,” he makes it clear that the 
decision to believe in the existence of God cannot be made on objective 
grounds but relies on purely subjective considerations. “Let us weigh the gain 
and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you 
gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then without hesita­
tion that He is.”61 Although Kierkegaard does not put forward a wager-style 
argument, both thinkers affirm that the object of faith is objectively uncertain 
and, therefore, the decision to believe always involves a risk.
For Kierkegaard, between faith and knowledge, there is an unbridgeable 
gap. Faith is set apart from knowledge into a sphere of its own; it believes 
what for the understanding is the paradox and the absurd. For the believer, 
the absurd is not the absurd because faith transforms it.62 But it remains absurd 
for the understanding even as one believes, for the contradiction residing at 
the heart of the absolute paradox cannot be overcome in any form of knowl­
edge. The absolute paradox cannot be known but only believed. At no point 
can the absolute paradox be mediated by the understanding. It is precisely 
because the absolute paradox lies beyond the grasp of the understanding that 
the passion of faith arises, that faith becomes the highest passion of subjec­
tivity.
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Conclusion
In a comparative examination of two religious thinkers belonging to such dis­
parate traditions as Buddhism and Christianity are, while structural similari­
ties between shinjin and faith may be recognized, in terms of content, radical 
differences are to be expected. We can find such similar features as the point 
that shinjin arises in human beings through the power of Amida as faith arises 
through the grace of God; or that the experience of shinjin is intimately related 
to the awareness of evil, as faith is to the consciousness of sin. But from these 
and other possible similarities, it does not follow that they share common ele­
ments in terms of content.
Shinjin for Shinran is not to be understood as a religious experience be­
tween a subject and an object of faith. For Shinran, shinjin arises in us entirely 
by the power of Amida. It follows that shinjin is beyond any decision, volun­
tary choice, or act of resolution on the part of human beings. Any agency in 
shinjin must be ascribed to Amida. In other words, Amida’s Buddha-nature 
becomes one with the human self. In this sense, we could say that shinjin is 
a non-relational state of mind in which Amida Buddha’s mind opens forth in 
the minds of human beings. Human subjectivity in shinjin is completely 
eclipsed by the power of Amida.
For Kierkegaard, however, neither God’s grace, alone, nor an act of will 
can bring about faith, both are required. Faith is a gift of God. However, a 
free act of will is required if the gift is to be received. The individual must 
choose whether or not to accept it. Rejection is possible. For faith as gift of 
God is not forced on the existing individual against his will. As Kierkegaard 
puts it: “God can give help for what only freedom can do.”63 Human deci­
sion is demanded by the very paradoxical character of the object of faith. The 
claim that the eternal God becomes temporal in the historical figure of Jesus 
absolutely transcends human standards of knowledge. Faced with the objec­
tive uncertainty of this fact, only by a passionate decision can the individual 
hold fast to its truth. The only certainty provided is the continued striving of 
the individual. Hence, faith is not something accomplished or attained once 
and for all at one specific moment. As a personal relationship between God 
and human beings, faith must be maintained by constant striving. The human 
person is never free from the temptation of disobedience to God. Although 
63 Ibid. 1978, p. 576.
200
SOUSA: SHINJIN AND FAITH
essentially a gift of God, faith must be sustained by a continual effort of the 
will.
Thus, shinjin and faith are two fundamentally different concepts that point 
to very distinctive religious experiences, shaped and produced by widely 
diverse religious contexts. Shinjin and faith are not simply different terms 
which point to a single reality sought by Shin Buddhist and Christian adher­
ents. Shinjin in Shin Buddhism and faith in Christianity each fosters differ­
ent sorts of experiences and dispositions in their respective members. In line 
with a cultural-linguistic approach to religion, the distinctive patterns of story, 
belief, and behavior that give shinjin and faith their specific and sometimes 
contradictory meanings are significant. The focus is on what is particular and 
specific to both concepts rather than on possible general similarities.
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